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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Matthew James Gonzales appeals from the judgment and sentence 
entered upon his guilty plea to felony injury to a child. On appeal, he argues the 
district court abused its discretion by denying his post-sentencing motion to 
withdraw his guiity plea and by imposing an excessive sentence. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
While in Gonzales' care for just a matter of minutes on January 21, 2011, 
three-year-old AB. sustained multiple injuries, the type and severity of which 
were "consistent with abuse." (R., pp.15-17; PSI, pp.2-3.) Specifically, she 
sustained: (1) an acute subdural hemorrhage (i.e., bleeding between the brain 
and the skull), (2) an acute "high-force" fracture of her upper right arm, just below 
the shoulder, (3) bilateral multi-layer retinal hemorrhages (i.e., bleeding in the 
back of the eyes), and (4) hypoxic/anoxic brain damage (i.e., brain damage 
caused by oxygen deprivation). (R., pp.15-17; PSI, p.2.) Gonzales reported to 
doctors and AB.'s mother that AB. had fallen while out of his sight and suffered 
a seizure. (R., p.15; PSI, p.2.) However, Gonzales' version of events was 
inconsistent with the nature and extent of AB. 's injuries, which indicated AB. 
had "experienced a high-energy trauma," including "abusive head trauma." (R., 
pp.15-17.) Doctors also ruled out the possibiiity that AB.'s injuries were 
preexisting: Although AB. had been hospitalized approximately two weeks 
earlier for injuries she sustained after she reportedly fell out of her crib, doctors 
conclusively determined that those previous injuries were unrelated to and did 
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"not account for" the subdural and retinal hemorrhages, broken arm 
damageA.B. presented with on January 21. (R., .16-17; 3.) 
The state with injury to a in 
original Information that Gonzales "did having the care or custody of a minor 
child, A.B., cause or permit said child to be injured, or placed in such situation 
that the child's person or health was endangered, by shaking A.B." (R., pp.67-
68.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, the state amended the Information by 
deleting the words "by shaking A.B."; Gonzales pied guilty to felony injury to a 
child, as amended; and the state agreed to recommend a unified sentence of 
years, with three years fixed. (R., 108-115, 117-19; Tr., pp.1-10.) The district 
court accepted Gonzales' piea and imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with 
five years fixed. (R., pp.122-26.) Gonzales timely appealed from the judgment. 
(R., pp.130-33.) 
While his appeal was pending, Gonzales moved to withdraw his guilty 
plea. (Augmentation: 6/12/12 Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea; 8/17/12 
Amended Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea And To Set Aside Conviction; 9/12/12 
Second Amended Motion To VVithdraw Guilty Plea And To Set Aside Conviction; 
2/26/13 Affidavit Of Matthew Gonzales In Support Of Motions To Withdraw Guilty 
Plea.) He also filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (Augmentation: 
8/3/12 Rule 35 Motion.) The district court denied both motions, and also denied 
Gonzales' motion for reconsideration of the denial of his Rule 35 motion. 
(Augmentations: 6/27 /13 Order Denying Rule 35 Motion; 11 /14/13 Decision On 
Defendant's Motions To Reconsider And Withdraw Guilty Plea.) Gonzales 
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thereafter filed an amended notice of appeal. (11/18/13 Amended Notice Of 
Appeal.) 
On appeal, the state filed a motion to remand; however, Gonzales filed an 
objection to that request and the Court denied the motion. (Order Denying 
Motion for Remand, dated June 30, 2014.) 
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ISSUES 
Gonzales states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did district err in denying Mr. 
Withdraw Guilty Plea? 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed 
upon Mr. Gonzales a sentence of ten years, with five years 
fixed, following his plea of guilty to felony injury to a child? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
-1 
I. 
2. 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
Has Gonzales failed to show the district court abused its discretion 
concluding Gonzales failed to carry his burden of establishing any 
manifest injustice entitling him to the post-sentencing withdrawal of 
guilty plea? 
Has Gonzales failed to show the unified sentence of 10 years, with five 
years fixed, imposed upon his guilty plea to felony injury to a child is 
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Gonzales Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Denying His Post-Sentencing Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
After the district court imposed a sentence in excess of 
recommended by the parties, Gonzales moved to withdraw his guilty 
(Augmentation: 6/12/12 Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea (hereinafter "Motion"); 
8/17/12 Amended Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea And To Set Aside Conviction 
(hereinafter "Amended Motion"); 9/12/12 Second Amended Motion To Withdraw 
Guilty Plea And To Set Aside Conviction (hereinafter "Second Amended 
Motion"); 2/26/13 Affidavit Of Matthew Gonzales In Support Of Motions To 
Withdraw Guilty Plea (hereinafter "Affidavit").) Gonzales did not offer any 
specific justification the request in either his original or first amended motion 
to withdraw his plea. generally Motion; Amended Motion.) In his second 
amended motion, filed five months after he was sentenced, Gonzales claimed 
the first time that his plea was "defective in that at the time [he] entered his guilty 
plea, [he] never admitted to any facts that would implicate culpability to support 
the alleged crime" and that the "guilty plea [did] not support either the mens rea 
or actus rea [sic] for the crime of Injury to Child." (Second Amended Motion, 
pp.1-2.) Nearly five months after that, Gonzales filed an affidavit alleging, inter 
afia, that he pied guilty in reliance on trial counsel's representation that, to secure 
a conviction, the state only had to prove he "was in the house" and "was being 
inattentive" when A. sustained her injuries. (Affidavit, p.6.) 
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district court ultimately denied Gonzales' motions withdraw 
guilty plea, concluding Gonzales failed to carry his burden of demonstrating 
manifest injustice necessitating withdrawal of plea. 11 /1 3 
Decision On Defendant's Motions To Reconsider And Withdraw Guilty Plea 
(hereinafter "Decision").) Specifically, the court found that Gonzales failed to 
present any evidence to establish his plea was not knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily entered. (Decision, pp.8-9.) The court also found that Gonzales' 
admissions, entered on the record at the change of plea hearing, satisfied the 
elements of felony injury to a child. (Decision, pp.9-11.) 
Gonzales challenges the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 
arguing as he did below that he "did not understand the elements of the offense 
at the time of his plea" and, as such, the "plea could not have been knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary." (Appellant's brief, p.6.) Gonzales has failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion because the issue of whether his counsel 
provided incorrect legal advice in relation to his guilty plea is one of ineffective 
assistance of counsel that must be addressed in post-conviction proceedings 
rather than on a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 1 
B. Standard Of Review 
Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
determining whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion, as 
1 The state is asserting a legal theory and analysis other than that utilized by the 
district court. A correct ruling entered on an erroneous basis will be affirmed on 
the correct legal basis. See,~, State v. Allen, 156 Idaho 332, _, 325 P.3d 
673, 677 (Ct. App. 2014). 
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distinguished arbitrary . State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 1, 1 p 
51, 53 (1993); State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295,298, 281, 284 (1990); 
State v. Jackson, Idaho 587, 532 P.2d 926, 929 (1975). 
the denial of a post-sentencing motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the appellate 
court examines the entire record to determine whether it is manifestly unjust 
preclude the defendant from withdrawing a guilty plea. State v. Banuelos, 1 
Idaho 569, 574, 861 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Ct. App. 1993). 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded Gonzales Failed To Show Any 
Manifest lniustice Entitling Him To \/Vithdraw His Guilty Plea 
Generally, a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea will not be granted after 
sentencing. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295,298, 787 P.2d 281,284 (1990); 
Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 14_5, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App. 1988). A 
court may permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing 
upon a satisfactory showing by the defendant that withdrawal of the guilty plea is 
necessary to correct a "manifest injustice." I.C.R 33(c). The strictness of the 
standard is justified by the legal weight of the guilty plea. "A plea of guilty has 
the same force and effect as a judgment rendered after a full trial on the " 
Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 346, 647 P.2d 796, 802 (Ct. App. 1982). The 
stricter standard also insures that the defendant is not "encouraged to plead 
guilty to test the weight of potential punishment and withdraw the plea if the 
sentence is unexpectedly severe." State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333, 208 P.3d 
734, 737 (Ct. . 2009). The defendant has the burden of proving that the 
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be withdrawn. Stone, 147 Idaho at 333, 208 P.3d at State v. 
Gomez, 124 1 178, 857 P.2d 656, 657 (Ct. App. 1993). 
As he did argues his was 
because his attorney erroneously informed him of the mental state necessary for 
guilt and this error was never corrected on the record. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-
15.) Because Gonzales' claim is at its core a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the district court should have declined to consider it and instead allowed 
Gonzales to assert the claim in a petition for post-conviction relief. 
1. Gonzales' Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Is Properly 
Considered In Post-Conviction Relief 
In ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the district court must 
determine, as a threshold matter, whether the plea was entered knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily. State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 
111 (1991); State v. Salazar-Garcia, 145 Idaho 690,692, 183 P.3d 778, 780 (Ct. 
App. 2008). As a matter of constitutional due process, a plea is voluntary and 
intelligent if the defendant understands the nature of the charge to which he or 
she is pleading guilty, including the critical elements of the charged offense. 
Salazar-Garcia, 145 Idaho at 692, 183 P.3d at 780 (citing, inter alia, Bradshaw v. 
Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005); Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645-47 
(1976)); Martinez v. State, 143 Idaho 789, 792, 152 P.3d 1237, 1240 (Ct. App. 
2007) (citing, inter alia, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)). "Due 
process does not require, however, that an explanation of every element of the 
offense must always be given to the defendant on the record before a valid guilty 
8 
plea may be taken." Martinez, 143 Idaho at 792, 152 P.3d at 1240 (citing State 
v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 2004)); see also 
Morgan, 426 U.S. at 647 n.18 (assuming "notice of the true nature, or substance, 
of a charge" does not "always require[] a description of every element of the 
offense"). Rather, there are other means by which a defendant may "gain an 
adequate understanding of the offense to permit a valid guilty plea." Salazar-
Garcia, 145 Idaho at 692, 183 P.3d at 780 (citing Bradshaw, 545 U.S. 175; 
Mayer, 139 Idaho at 647, 84 P.3d at 583). Among the "[s]ignificant factors" to 
consider in assessing whether a defendant had actual notice of the elements of 
the charge to which he or she pied guilty is "whether the charge or a pleaded 
element of the charge is a self-explanatory term or has such a simple or 
common meaning that a lay person can be expected to be aware of it." Salazar-
Garcia, 145 Idaho at 692-93, 183 P.3d at 780-81 (citing Martinez, 143 Idaho at 
793, 152 P.3d at 1241; Mayer, 139 Idaho at 645-49, 84 P.3d at 581-85; Noel v. 
State, 113 Idaho 92, 95-96, 741 P.2d 728, 731-32 (Ct. App. 1987)). 
In this case the state concedes that the record does not affirmatively 
demonstrate that the mental state element of the charge was explained to 
Gonzales. However, Gonzales' claim that he misunderstood that element was 
asserted in his affidavit as follows: "[Defense counsel] also told me that all [the 
prosecutor] had to prove was that I was being inattentive" and "that all the State 
had to prove was that I was in the house and therefore I was responsible for the 
injuries." (Affidavit, p. 6.) He decided to plead guilty because a trial was "too 
risky if all the State had to prove was that I wasn't being attentive." (Affidavit, p. 
g 
6.) Gonzalez' claim is thus ultimately one of ineffective assistance of counsel. It 
has long been the law that the "proper forum" for claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel "is post conviction proceedings as provided by I.C, § 19-4901 et seq." 
State v. Blackburn, 99 Idaho 222, 222-23, 579 P.2d 1205, 1205-06 (1978). In 
State v. Haves, 138 Idaho 761, 763, 69 P.3d 181, 183 (Ct. App. 2003), Hayes 
moved to withdraw his plea, claiming that his counsel was ineffective. The 
district court declined to address the claim, concluding that development of a 
proper evidentiary record "could best be done in the context of a post-conviction 
proceeding." !<L at 766, 69 P.3d at 186. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed, 
stating that it does not "ordinarily" address "claims of ineffective assistance on 
direct appeal ... because the record on direct appeal is rarely adequate for 
review of such claims." !<L Addressing such claims without an adequate record 
could also result in an incorrect decision becoming "res judicata, thereby barring 
the claim in a post-conviction action." !<L 
These considerations apply here and the same outcome as in Hayes 
should be reached in this case. Gonzales claimed in his affidavit that his 
attorney affirmatively misled him about the mental state element by informing 
him that proof of negligence was sufficient for conviction. Three times he 
requested an evidentiary hearing on those claims, all of which the district court 
denied. (Decision on Defendant's Motions and Order Re: Evidentiary Hearing, 
pp. 5-8; Order Denying Second Motion to Set Evidentiary Hearing and Second 
Motion to Transport; Decision, p. 4 (augmentation).) Gonzalez was clearly 
attempting to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective 
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assistance of counsel in this case when such hearings should be reserved for 
post-conviction proceedings. 
The district court concluded that the record demonstrated that Gonzales' 
plea admitted he acted willfully. (Decision, pp. 10-11.) The district court, 
however, applied the LC. § 18-101 definition of willfully (Decision, p. 10), which 
was erroneous. State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 64 P.3d 296 (2002). Applying 
the correct legal standard as articulated in Young, the state concedes that the 
plea colloquy specifically, and the record generally, do not disprove Gonzales' 
claim that he believed the standard was negligence because his attorney told 
him so. Because the district court did not reach the issue of what advice counsel 
provided, however, that is an as-yet unresolved factual question. The state 
submits that resolution of that factual question should occur in post-conviction 
proceedings. 
2. Gonzales' Claim That He Did Not Specifically Admit His Conduct Was 
Willful Does Not Establish Manifest Injustice 
Gonzales argues that "willfulness was never established" by his plea. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 14.2) To the extent he is arguing that failure to admit all 
elements of the crime is grounds for withdrawal of his plea, such is not supported 
by law. To the contrary, a valid guilty plea may be entered without any 
2 Gonzales argues that the lack of a specific admission of willfulness "combined 
with the statements in his affidavit" show he misunderstood the mental state 
element of the crime. (Appellant's brief, p. 14.) Because the argument that the 
motion to withdraw should have been granted based on counsel's erroneous 
advice is set forth elsewhere in the brief (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-17), the state 
interprets this argument as a claim that the record does not refute his claim of an 
erroneous understanding based on counsel's advice. 
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admission of guilt. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). Any failure 
to specifically and on the record admit the mental state associated with the crime 
does not render the plea invalid or show manifest injustice. 
11. 
Gonzales Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Gonzales challenges the unified sentence of 10 years, with five years 
fixed, imposed upon his conviction for felony injury to a child. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.18-21.) A review of the record supports the sentence imposed. Gonzales 
has failed to establish the sentencing court abused its discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. JQ,_ 
C. Gonzales Has Failed To Show His Sentence Is Excessive Under Any 
Reasonable View Of The Facts 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden 
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence 
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to achieve the 
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primary objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of 
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. lg_,_ 
"[T]he most fundamental requirement [of sentencing] is reasonableness." 
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and 
citation omitted). "vVhen reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court 
will make an independent examination of the record, having regard to the nature 
of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public 
interest." lg_,_ Contrary to Gonzales' arguments on appeal, an examination of the 
record in this case shows his sentence is eminently reasonable. 
Gonzales was responsible for inflicting the following injuries on a three 
year old: (1) an acute subdural hemorrhage (i.e., bleeding between the brain and 
the skull), (2) an acute "high-force" fracture of her upper right arm, just below the 
shoulder, (3) bilateral multi-layer retinal hemorrhages (i.e., bleeding in the back 
of the eyes), and (4) hypoxic/anoxic brain damage (i.e., brain damage caused by 
oxygen deprivation). (Tr., p. 100, Ls. 2-10, p. 103, Ls. 4-18 (finding that 
Gonzales inflicted the injuries); R., pp.15-17; PSI, p.2.) The district court 
considered the legal factors (Tr., p. 100, Ls. 2-5; p. 105, Ls. 10-22) and 
mitigating circumstances (Tr., p. 105, L. 23 - p. 106, L. 12). It considered 
Gonzales' criminal record, which the district court concluded demonstrated a 
"reckless disregard for the safety of others" and "undue risk" Gonzales would 
commit another crime if put on probation. (Tr., p. 104, Ls. 5-23.) Ultimately the 
sentence, however, rested on the nature of the crime and the harm it caused. 
(Tr., p. 106, L. 12 - p. 107, L. 5.) The district court also ran the sentence 
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concurrent with a prior sentence being imposed on a probation violation. (Tr., p. 
109, L. 11 - p. 111, L. 9.) The record supports the district court's exercise of 
discretion. 
Gonzales argues that the "strong support from his family" is an "important 
fact that should have received the attention of the district court," that he has a 
good employment record, and that he expressed remorse. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
18-20.) This argument is baseless because the district court specifically 
considered Gonzales' family support, history as "a hard worker," and his feelings 
of "true remorse." (Tr., p. 106, Ls. 2-21.) Because the district court specifically 
considered the factors Gonzales identifies as mitigating and properly exercised 
its discretion under the applicable legal standards, he has failed to show any 
abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and 
sentence, with the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel being reserved for 
post-conviction proceedings. 
DATED this y!h day of July 2014. 
~EN!;fETH JORGENSEN 
~ty Attorney General 
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